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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many postulated that 2010 would drastically alter the landscape of 
subject matter eligibility under § 101 of the Patent Act, finally 
providing clarity to this area of the law.1 Despite such hopes, this 
anticipation was eventually met with the realization that perhaps the 
judiciary is not the appropriate vehicle to provide meaningful answers 
to the ambiguities inherent in patent law.2 The Federal Circuit’s decision 
in Prometheus v. Mayo3 represented what should be the final significant 
§ 101 case to impact process patents for diagnostic testing. Despite the 
multitude of case law before the courts last year, patentees are still left 
with the same uncertainty that existed when this issue developed at the 
forefront of patent disputes several years ago.4 Although the Supreme 
Court’s consideration of Bilski v. Kappos5 determined that the machine-
or-transformation (hereinafter “MOT”) test created by the Federal 
Circuit would no longer represent the exclusive standard for which 
method patents may be measured,6 courts remain encumbered by 
decades-worth of patent eligibility tests and no definitive formula to 
apply such standards. 
Despite this lack of clarity, the progression of case law 
demonstrates the likelihood that diagnostic method claims will pass 
muster under § 101 where such claims are determined not to preempt a 
fundamental principle. This illuminates the concern that where such 
methods are deemed patentable, liability will attach where a physician 
performs a patented diagnostic method. Rather than leaving this matter 
to the courts, resulting in protracted litigation and fostering uncertainty 
among would-be patentees, the appropriate solution may lie with 
Congress. Over the past ten years, legislation has been introduced in 
Congress aimed at preventing physicians from facing legal 
consequences due to their use of patented genetic testing, in terms of 
 
1 Dan Vorhaus & John Conley, Bilski and Biotech: Business As Usual, For Now, 
GENOMIC LAW REPORT (June 28, 2010), http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php 
/2010/06/28/bilski-and-biotechnology/. 
2 Prometheus v. Mayo, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Dan Vorhaus & John Conley, 
Prometheus Unbound — Again, GENOMIC LAW REPORT (Dec. 17, 2010), 
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2010/12/17/prometheus-unbound-again/. 
3 Prometheus, 628 F.3d 1347. 
4 Subject matter eligibility was a key issue in the Federal Circuit’s ruling in In re Bilski, 
545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
5 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
6 Id. at 3227.  
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both the patented composition of matter and the diagnostic tests relating 
to such genetic determinations.7 While the extensive nature of such 
legislation may have deleterious consequences for gene-based patents,8 
it can provide instruction for a more narrowly tailored legislative effort 
to exempt physicians from infringement liability in certain situations. 
In the past, where a patent claim met one of the defined categories 
— machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or process — the 
claim was presumed eligible under § 101.9 In fact, regarding 
biotechnical claims, “[s]o long as there was some element of human 
intervention, such as isolation of a gene sequence or genetic engineering 
of a living organism, biotechnology inventions were generally assumed 
to be eligible for patent protection.”10 With the rapid development of 
biotechnology and the related patents, so too grows the fear that such 
inventions cover not only human discoveries, but also the natural 
biological associations upon which the inventions are claimed. 
The concern for patentees generated by the recent § 101 debate is 
twofold. First, there is still a fear that the Federal Circuit will continue 
to apply the MOT test based on the Supreme Court’s pronouncement of 
the test as an “investigative tool.”11 Second, if the patentability of 
diagnostic methods is put into doubt, this will severely disincentivize 
funding for research and development. On the other end of the 
spectrum, opponents of a more broadly defined patentability 
requirement fear the detrimental effects that the privatization of 
diagnostic testing will have on the healthcare industry, both in terms of 
patient care and rising costs. The inherent conflict created for physicians 
may, 
[I]nhibit doctors from using their best medical judgment; . . . force 
doctors to spend unnecessary time and energy to enter into license 
agreements; . . . divert resources from the medical task of healthcare 
 
7 See Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong. (2007) 
[hereinafter GRAA]; Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 
3967, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter GRDAA].  
8 See infra Part IV(B) and (C).  
9 Maayan Filmar, A Critique of In Re Bilski, 20 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 
L. 11, 11 (2009) (“Industrial age inventions fell easily into at least one of these four 
statutory categories. Information age inventions, however, complicate the analysis under 
section 101 and blur the boundaries of its enumerated categories.”). 
10 Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Bilski on Biotechnology, HOLMAN’S BIOTECH 
IP BLOG, (Jul. 3, 2010, 11:22 AM), http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/2010/07 
/impact-of-bilski-on-biotechnology.html. 
11 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.  
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to the legal task of searching patent files for similar simple 
correlations; [and,] raise the cost of healthcare while inhibiting its 
effective delivery.12 
This Note concludes that the Patent Office and courts will continue 
to find diagnostic tests patent-eligible based on recent case law. In an 
effort to better balance the competing policy rationales between 
bestowing inventors with necessary property rights in their inventions, 
and a physician’s right to give — and a patient’s corresponding right to 
receive — a proper medical diagnosis, Congress should impose 
meaningful limitations on liability for physicians who perform such 
tests. While performance would still constitute patent infringement, 
liability would not attach for physicians as it would if the patented tests 
were performed in a research setting. 
This Note will begin in Part II with a discussion of the relevant 
statutory provisions within the Patent Act, specifically the subject 
matter eligibility requirement and its application to process claims. Part 
III will discuss the case law leading up to the Federal Circuit’s decision 
in Prometheus II. Part IV will introduce the Medical Practitioner 
Exception and legislative measures that could amend the exception to 
better serve the relevant policy rationales. This Note will conclude in 
Part V that certain amendments can be made to the Medical Practitioner 
Exception that would allow diagnostic methods to retain patentability so 
crucial to the biotechnology industry, but afford physicians a modicum 
of protection where patented methods are used in the course of 
diagnosis or treatment of patients. 
II. PATENT ELIGIBILITY AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
The Patent Act’s subject matter requirement, § 101, ensures that a 
claim is derived from discoveries or inventions in which human 
innovation acted as the primary driver.13 Even with this limitation, the 
subject matter requirement has been read broadly by the Supreme Court 
to make patentable “anything under the sun that is made by man,”14 with 
narrow exclusions for natural phenomena, laws of nature, and abstract 
 
12 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite, 548 U.S. 124, 138 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).  
13 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2008). “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.” Id. 
14 S. REP. NO. 1979, at 5 (1952). 
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ideas.15 This line is often blurred in medical and biotechnical patent 
claims due to the complex endeavor of melding scientific inquiry and 
discovery with the laws of nature.16 Frequently the ineffective 
distinction between what constitutes a natural, as opposed to man-made, 
process forms the basis for process claim rejections. 
While common sense definitions of machine, manufacture and 
composition of matter are generally uncontested, defining what 
constitutes a “process claim” remains somewhat more complicated. 
Although § 100(b) provides a statutory definition,17 case law provides a 
more detailed attempt to distill the components of a process. The 
Supreme Court, in Cochrane v. Deener,18 found that a process is “a 
mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. . .[and] 
it is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to be 
transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.”19 From this, the 
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have enunciated several tests for 
process claims, but cautioned against limiting the inquiry to a single 
test.20 Despite differences among these tests, each has been understood 
to represent the rule against patenting natural phenomena, laws of 
nature, and abstract ideas.21 
III. 35 U.S.C. § 101: THE SHIFT IN THE SUBJECT MATTER 
ELIGIBILITY DOCTRINE FOR PROCESS PATENTS AS IT HAS 
DEVELOPED BEFORE AND AFTER BILSKI AND 
PROMETHEUS 
Originally, the term “useful art” as it is applied in § 101 was 
thought to refer to technological innovation.22 Courts have long referred 
to patent protection as existing specifically to ensure technological 
 
15 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
16 Jeffery M. Kuhn, Patentable Subject Matter Matters: New Uses for an Old Doctrine, 
22 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 89, 103 (2007).  
17 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2008). “The term ‘process’ means process, art, or method, and 
includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or 
material.” Id. 
18 Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 780 (1876). 
19 Id. 
20 See infra Part II(B). 
21 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
22 In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 
F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
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expansion and innovation.23 Although never explicitly cabining patent 
law to a particular field, “several of [the Supreme Court’s] decision[s] 
implicitly tether patentability to technological innovations.”24 This 
narrow view of available subject matter has since expanded opening up 
the possibility that § 101 can cover any process, no matter the field from 
which it is derived.25 
Beginning in 1980, the Supreme Court embarked on what has been 
three decades of patent-eligibility expansion, starting with its rulings in 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty26 and Diamond v. Diehr.27 In Chakrabarty, the 
Court was faced with a reoccurring patent eligibility question regarding 
engineered bacteria. Chakrabarty “manufactured” bacteria capable of 
breaking down the components of crude oil, extremely useful in the 
cleanup of oil spills.28 These particular bacteria did not previously exist 
in nature and no other existing bacteria was said to perform the same 
function. The Court had faced the issue of engineered bacteria several 
decades earlier in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,29 
where the majority found that although the bacteria in question did not 
exist in nature, the inventor simply sought to patent nature’s handiwork 
through the combination of living organisms.30 The holding in 
Chakrabarty, in contrast, specifically found that human-made living 
organisms satisfied § 101. 
While declining to specifically overrule Funk Brothers, its 
continued viability in light of Chakrabarty is put into doubt. The Court 
stressed the difference as lying in human intervention — whereas in 
Funk Brothers the claim was drawn to bacteria resulting from a mixture 
of selected strains the result of which failed to produce different 
characteristics, Chakrabarty intentionally intervened to create a new 
strain of bacteria with traits never before observed.31 Perhaps the real 
fault with the underlying claim in Funk Brothers was the failure of the 
 
23 Bilksi, 545 F.3d at 1001 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
24 Id. at 1002 (citing Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998); Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant 
Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948)).  
25 State St. Bank v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc. 149 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  
26 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
27 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
28 Chakrabarty, 477 U.S. at 305. 
29 Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131. 
30 Id. 
31 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310. 
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new bacteria to meet the usefulness requirement.32 In determining that 
the bacteria constituted a product of nature, the Court relied on a finding 
that the organisms “perform[ed] in their natural way.”33 Therefore, 
instead of first examining the patent for its subject matter, the Court 
combined an analysis under §101 with an obviousness analysis properly 
construed under 35 U.S.C. § 103.34 Since the bacteria had not existed in 
that particular form prior to the combination of the selected strains it is 
hard to characterize the result as a product of nature. 
 Chief Justice Burger declined the invitation inherent in the 
petitioner’s argument to engage in a balancing test considering the 
hazards of allowing patent rights in certain subject matter versus the 
goal of promoting progress in the useful arts.35 Instead, Justice Burger 
stressed the importance of such concerns and the inability of the Court 
to entertain such policy matters which are better left for “resolution 
within the legislative process after the kind of investigation, 
examination, and study that legislative bodies can provide and courts 
cannot.”36 The Court’s task is simply to determine Congress’ meaning 
through its words and intent, and “once that is done [the Court’s] 
powers are exhausted.”37 
In the year following Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court confronted 
another § 101 issue in Diamond v. Diehr, this time involving a process 
 
32 See generally Brenner v. Mason, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966) “Unless and until a 
process is refined and developed to this point — where specific benefit exists in currently 
available form — there is insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to engross 
what may prove to be a broad field.” Id. 
33 Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131. 
34 See Brief for Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Inc as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants 
at 13, Ass’n of Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office et al., No. 2010-
1406 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2010), available at http://patentdocs.typepad.com/files/alnylam-
amicus-brief.pdf. 
The terminology used before the 1952 Patent Act speaks of ‘invention’ to 
describe the necessary advance in the art beyond novelty to establish 
patentability. This was superseded four years later in the 1952 Patent Act by the 
statutory test of ‘nonobviousness’ under what is today Section 103(a). Prior to 
the 1952 Patent Act, an invention which was ‘obvious’ was instead termed to 
lack patentable ‘invention.’ In Funk [Bros.] the Court found a patent to a 
mixture of known bacteria lacked ‘invention’ − in other words, that it was 
obvious. 
Id. 
35 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S at 317. 
36 Id. 
37 Id.  
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claim.38 The patent application in Diehr claimed a method for molding 
rubber into specific forms using a mathematical equation to determine 
when the molds had properly cured.39 The Court determined that a 
process utilizing a mathematical formula is not rendered unpatentable 
when it also transforms or reduces an article to a different state or 
thing.40 Although the process incorporated the Arrhenius equation into 
its claim to calculate the relationship between time and temperature in 
the cooling process, a “process is not unpatentable simply because it 
contains a law of nature or a mathematical algorithm.”41 
This decision paved the way for biological and medical patents 
currently flooding into the system. The Court seems to be borrowing a 
theme from copyright law which recognizes copyright protection for 
compilations.42 Although independently some or all of the components 
of a compilation might belong to the public domain, together they may 
constitute a work of original authorship. While patent law differs in 
many respects from copyright law, the underlying policy concept is 
similar — that which belongs in the public domain cannot be usurped 
into a privatized right.43 So long as a claim is read in its entirety and not 
in terms of its constituent parts considered apart from the whole, a claim 
for a process involving a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract 
idea can still satisfy a § 101 inquiry.44 
Prior to the Federal Circuit’s ruling in State Street v. Signature 
Financial Group, several opinions construing § 101 referenced a 
judicially-created doctrine in finding business methods ineligible for 
patent protection.45 The system at issue in State Street concerned a “hub 
and spoke” investment strategy whereby several mutual funds would 
pool their resources into a central portfolio thereby decreasing 
 
38 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981). 
39 Id.  
40 Id. at 184.  
41 Id. at 187 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)).  
42 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1978). A “‘compilation’ is a work formed by the 
collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, 
or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of 
authorship.” Id. 
43 See generally Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (introducing the idea/expression 
dichotomy into American Copyright jurisprudence, stating that ideas themselves are not 
copyrightable, while original expression is subject to copyright protection). 
44 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 193. 
45 State St. Bank v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc. 149 F.3d 1368, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(citing In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).  
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administrative costs and benefiting from the tax benefits associated with 
partnership.46 The district court dispensed with the patent claim on 
summary judgment relying on the “business method exception,” or in 
the alternative the “mathematical algorithm exception.”47 On appeal to 
the Federal Circuit, the court refused to endorse a judicially-created 
exception to § 101, stating that “it was Congress’s intent not to place 
any restrictions on the subject matter for which a patent may be 
obtained beyond those specifically recited” in the statute.48 Looking at 
the plain language of the statute, the Congressional record and the 
Manual of Patent Examining Procedures,49 Judge Rich inferred that 
without express limitations dictated by Congress, the “first door” to 
patentability should be left wide open, thereby striking down the 
“exceptions” relied on by the lower court.50 
Returning to language from Chakrabarty and Diehr, the court 
stressed that beneath all processes lies a mathematical equation, a law of 
nature or an abstract idea.51 While those underlying concepts or ideas are 
not patentable, that which is created utilizing such knowledge can be 
subject to patent protection so long as it meets the other requirements of 
the Patent Act, specifically novelty, nonobviousness, and adequate 
notice and disclosure.52 The court correctly identified that although the 
claimed method in State Street may be overly broad, this is not a 
requirement under § 101, but rather under §§ 102, 103, and 112.53 
Considered as the turning point in the expansion of the subject matter 
eligibility discussion, the State Street opinion received endless criticism 
and is subject to continued debate.54 
The development of patentable subject matter for processes has 
greatly increased in breadth over the past half century to include various 
 
46 Id. at 1371. 
47 Id. at 1372. 
48 Id. at 1373. 
49 Id. at 1377 (quoting Examination Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7479 (1996) 
(“Claims should not be categorized as methods of doing business. Instead such claims 
should be treated like any other process claims.”)). 
50 Id. at 1372 n.2 (citing In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979)).  
51 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1374. 
52 Id. at 1375. 
53 Id. at 1377. 
54 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263 (1999) (discussing the disconnect between 
business method patents and the goals of the patent system in general).  
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genres, from manufactured biological processes55 to business method 
patents,56 even to the absurd.57 Furthermore, in addition to seeking 
patents for machines, manufactures or compositions of matter, inventors 
seek to fully monopolize the field by patenting the related process as 
well. Many respond negatively to patents on both products and 
processes in the biotechnology field due to the implications of such 
information on healthcare.58 However, on balance, those within the 
biotechnology field as well as other up-and-coming industries, are 
concerned that limiting patent eligibility at the outset of a claim 
examination will effectively push out claims from emerging fields based 
on an inability to conform to an outmoded conception of “process.”59 As 
opposed to other industries, which may or may not require extensive 
funding,60 the cost of research and development in the biotech industry 
reaches into the billions61 and in turn relies on its exclusive rights for 
profit and capital to continue developing new products. Limiting patent 
eligibility in this field would seemingly reduce innovation and increase 
secrecy until patentability could be assured. 
The line of cases leading up to the Supreme Court’s review of 
Bilski v. Kapos and the Federal Circuit’s rehearing of Prometheus, 
delineates the debate over where to draw the line for biotechnical 
process claims. Although the concern over the continued viability of 
business method patents struck fear into the hearts of large corporations, 
the uncertainty for diagnosis and treatment method patents affected not 
 
55 See discussion supra of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
56 See BANK OF AMERICA, https://www.bankofamerica.com/deposits/special-
programs/keep-the-change.go (last visited Apr. 24, 2011) (stating that currently Bank of 
America’s “Keep the Change Program” is listed as patent-pending).  
57 TOTALLY ABSURD INVENTIONS, http://totallyabsurd.com (last visited Apr. 29, 2011).  
58 See Brief for Appellees at 5-6, Ass’n of Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office et al., No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2010), available at 
http://patentdocs.typepad.com/files/brief-for-the-appellees.pdf (“[T]hese patent claims stifle 
vital clinical and research practices to the detriment of women’s health and scientific 
progress.”). 
59 See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U. S. 124 (2006) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d. 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting); infra Part 
III. 
60 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575, 1581-82 (2003) (discussing the industry-specific nature of research and development 
expenses and ultimately the incentive-based differences between some fields of innovation 
versus others). 
61 2008 Investment in U.S. Health Research, RESEARCH AMERICA, 
http://www.researchamerica.org/uploads/healthdollar08.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2011).  
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only those corporations controlling the industry but also physicians and 
patients alike. 
A. Labcorp v. Metabolite62 
Researchers at University Patents Inc. created and patented a 
process for testing for homocystine (an amino acid), and then 
correlating the concentration with Vitamin B levels in the body to 
determine vitamin deficiency (‘658 patent).63 Claim 13 covered any 
process (patented or unpatented) for measuring homocystine levels and 
“correlating” the level with a deficiency in Vitamin B.64 For example, a 
physician can satisfy the correlation step when she notes the test level 
and makes a mental comparison to a normal level. Metabolite acquired 
the ‘658 patent, and in 1991 sublicensed Labcorp to use the process in 
its research.65 The agreement contained a provision allowing Labcorp to 
terminate the agreement if “a more cost effective commercial alternative 
is available that does not infringe a valid and enforceable claim of” the 
patent.66 In 1998, Labcorp began using the Abbot Test, a new method 
for measuring homocystine levels, and ceased paying royalties to 
Metabolite.67 
Metabolite brought suit against Labcorp claiming patent 
infringement and breach of the license agreement. The jury found that 
Labcorp’s use of the Abbot Test infringed Claim 13 of the ‘658 patent 
and awarded damages for unpaid royalties of more than $4.6 million 
plus enhanced damages.68 The district court also enjoined Labcorp from 
performing homocystine tests, including the Abbot Test. Labcorp 
appealed to the Federal Circuit on the theory that Claim 13 was “invalid 
for indefiniteness, lack of written description, non-enablement, 
 
62 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
63 Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). This type of deficiency can cause numerous ailments including “vascular disease, 
cognitive dysfunction, birth defects and cancer. If detected early enough, however, vitamin 
supplements readily treat the deficiency.” Id.  
64 Id. 
65 Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 128 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 129. Labcorp claimed that the new test was a better alternative to the ‘658 
patent and therefore could take advantage of the termination provision in the licensing 
agreement. Id. 
68 Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1359. 
BEFELER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2011  7:38 PM 
2011 PATENT ELIGIBILITY FOR DIAGNOSTIC METHODS 495 
anticipation, and obviousness.”69 Furthermore, Labcorp argued that 
allowing Claim 13 to stand would allow Metabolite to “improperly gain 
a monopoly over a basic scientific fact rather than a novel invention of 
its own.”70 The Federal Circuit rejected these arguments, finding Claim 
13 to be patentable.71 The court declined to address Labcorp’s assertion 
that allowing Claim 13 to stand is tantamount to allowing a patent for a 
law of nature.72 The Supreme Court granted certiorari but later dismissed 
the case as improvidently granted based on a procedural fault:73 
Labcorp, although referring to the issue, had never specifically asserted 
that Claim 13 violated 35 U.S.C. § 101 in the lower courts.74 
Despite the dismissal of the writ, both the Supreme Court’s 
willingness to grant certiorari and Justice Breyer’s heated dissent joined 
by two other justices, demonstrate the current uncertainty surrounding 
the scope of subject matter eligibility for process claims in the 
biotechnology field. In his dissent, Justice Breyer stated that “[C]laim 
13 is invalid no matter how narrowly one reasonably interprets” the 
phenomenon of nature doctrine.75 Furthermore, the relationship between 
the process for measuring homocystine levels using either a patented or 
unpatented test and a vitamin deficiency is a natural occurrence 
observed through biology.76 Justice Breyer argued that the ability to 
patent a determination made in the mind of a physician extends patent 
law too far and subverts the purpose of this body of law.77 Breyer 
concluded his dissent with a policy argument for limiting the scope of 
patentability in order to protect the medical profession.78 Articulating the 
“anti-commons argument,”79 Breyer focused on the high transaction 
 
69 Id (citing Brief for Appellant, at 38).  
70 Id (citing Brief for Appellant, at 41). 
71 Id. at 1358. 
72 Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 131 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
73 Id. at 125. 
74 Id. at 132 (Breyer, J., dissenting). (Justice Breyer also found sufficient procedural 
grounds upon which the Court should have heard the case, citing both the parties’ briefs to 
the Court and their arguments below as evidence of a prior dispute as to subject matter 
eligibility).  
75 Id. at 135. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 136. 
78 Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 138. (The Court’s failure to invalidate this patent claim 
“threatens to leave the medical profession subject to the restrictions. . ..”). 
79 See generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998), available 
at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/280/5364/698 (discussing how the 
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costs associated with an increased distribution of patents. The 
transaction costs of exclusivity affect physicians’ abilities to practice 
medicine efficiently by imposing time, energy and financial 
constraints.80 Consequently, the overflow of these problems hinders the 
healthcare system as a whole. To avoid confusion or decreased 
investment due to uncertainty, Breyer reasoned that the Court should 
address this issue to provide clarity as to the legal rights and obligations 
of medical practitioners.81 
B. In re Bilski82 
Considered the perfect opportunity for the Supreme Court to 
narrow the scope of §101, Bilski focused not on a biotechnical process, 
but rather on a method of doing business. The claim at issue was drawn 
on a method for hedging risk in commodities markets.83 The process 
required an intermediary to buy from both the supplier and the 
consumer at fixed costs thereby assuring quantity and price while 
hedging the risk involved in the commodities market.84 The U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office examiner and later the Board of Patent Appeals, 
rejected the claim, finding that it failed to demonstrate a meaningful 
transformation because it entails only intangible elements — “non-
physical financial risks and legal liabilities of the commodity provider, 
the consumer, and the market-participants.”85 In other words, the method 
attempted to claim an abstract idea. 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered several judicially-created 
tests for determining subject matter eligibility for process claims. The 
first of these tests, the Freeman-Walter-Abele Test, was defined and 
articulated over the course of three opinions arising out of the United 
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.86 The test sets forth two 
steps: (1) determine whether the claim recites an “algorithm;” and, (2) 
 
privatization and exclusivity of patent rights can actually hinder innovation downstream 
when researchers require multiple licenses to perform those tasks necessary to bring about a 
new innovation). 
80 Lab. Corp., 548 U.S at 138.  
81 Id. 
82 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
83 Id.at 949. 
84 Id. at 950. 
85 Id.  
86 See, e.g., In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).  
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determine whether that algorithm is “applied in any manner to physical 
elements or process steps.”87 The Federal Circuit in State Street doubted 
whether this test had survived Supreme Court scrutiny after Diehr and 
Chakrabarty.88 Relying on these opinions, the majority in Bilski 
concluded that the Freeman-Walter-Abele test is “inadequate” in that “a 
claim failing [this] test may nonetheless be patent-eligible.”89 
The court in State Street referred to the second of these tests, the 
“useful, concrete, and tangible result,” as a way of showing that certain 
types of nonconforming subject matter — i.e. mathematical algorithms 
— are nothing more than abstract ideas until given a practical 
application at which point they satisfy § 101.90 While in certain 
instances this test provided clarity as to whether a claim was drawn to a 
fundamental concept, the court in Bilski found it insufficient to 
determine patent eligibility.91 The third and final test considered by the 
court, a technological arts test, represented a quasi-attempt to reinstate 
specific field exceptions. Although dissimilar from the business method 
and mathematical algorithm exceptions proposed in State Street, which 
sought to exclude certain subject matter, a technological arts test would 
restrict subject matter to only those inventions involving applied science 
or mathematics.92 The court refused to adopt such a test on the premise 
that that defining “technological arts” and “technology” proved far too 
“ambiguous and ever-changing.”93 Further, the court would not entertain 
implementing “field-of-use” limitations, stating that such limitations 
could not transform a claim for a fundamental process into a patentable 
claim.94 
The Federal Circuit resolved the conflict over which test to apply 
by holding that the MOT test is the sole test by which subject matter 
eligibility should be determined.95 The court did acknowledge that this 
test perhaps contradicted prior standards enunciated in the Supreme 
 
87 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959 (quoting In re Abele, 684 F.2d at 905-07).  
88 State St. Bank v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc. 149 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  
89 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959.  
90 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en 
banc)). 
91 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959-60. 
92 Id. at 960.  
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 954. 
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Court,96 even suggesting that its own test would require refinement in 
light of future technology.97 Judge Michel began his opinion by 
discussing “process” claims (conceding that Bilski’s claim would meet 
the literal definition found in § 101), and delineating three instances 
where such claims can never constitute patentable subject matter: those 
that attempt to preempt laws of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract 
ideas.98 The real issue requires determining whether the claim “recites a 
fundamental principle, and, if so, whether it would pre-empt 
substantially all uses of that fundamental principle.”99 Determining 
whether the claim is sufficiently limited in scope requires that the court 
adopt a test that efficiently cabins claims for abstract ideas. The court 
based its reasoning on the theory that where a claim is drawn to a 
machine or involves a transformation, it transcends abstract subject 
matter to create a tangible, useful method or process. While this is 
somewhat similar to the “useful, concrete, and tangible result” 
promulgated by State Street,100 the Bilski test extends one step further by 
defining how such a result can be obtained. 
The MOT test is a two-pronged inquiry whereby an applicant can 
satisfy either by demonstrating that his or her claim is (1) tied to a 
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) transforms a particular article 
into a different state of thing.101 Two limitations apply to this test. First, 
the use of a specific machine or transformation of an article must 
impose meaningful limits on the claim’s scope to impart patent-
eligibility.102 Second, the machine or transformation step cannot be an 
insignificant extra-solution activity,103 an example of which is an 
insufficient data-gathering step used to disguise a claim drawn to an 
algorithm as a patent-eligible claim.104 The court stressed that the 
 
96 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972) (the Court supplemented its holding by 
stating that it “[did] not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the 
requirements of [its] prior precedent.”).  
97 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 955-56 (“Nevertheless, we agree that future developments in 
technology and the science may present difficult challenges to the machine-or-
transformation test . . . the Supreme Court may ultimately decide to alter or perhaps even set 
aside this test to accommodate emerging technologies[.]”). 
98 Id. at 952. 
99 Id. at 954. 
100 State St. Bank v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc. 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
101 Bilski, 545 F.3d. at 961. 
102 Id. (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72). 
103 Id. (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)). 
104 See In re Gram, 888 F.2d 835, 837 (Fed. Cir. 1989). But see In re Abele, 684 F.2d 
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“transformation must be central to the purpose of the claimed 
process.”105 Accordingly, at least two specific processes automatically 
qualify as a transformation: chemical or physical transformations of a 
physical object or substance,106 and an electronic transformation of data 
into a visual depiction so long as the claim is limited to a practical 
application of the fundamental principle.107 The court elaborated further 
on the concept of “insufficient data-gathering” by repeating its holding 
from In re Gram that the process of performing clinical tests and 
subsequently determining results and causes is not sufficiently 
transformative.108 
Applying the MOT test to the claim at hand, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that Bilski could not satisfy either prong.109 The process 
lacked involvement of any physical objects and/or substances. The only 
transformation to occur would shift an intangible concept of risk. The 
real exchange is that of “legal rights.”110 Because the Bilski claim neither 
was tied to a machine nor transformed an article, it could not satisfy the 
court’s new patent-eligibility standard. Furthermore, as a matter of 
policy, the claim was drawn on a purely mental process involving a 
mathematical calculation of risk in the mind of the intermediary, and 
then action on such a determination by consummating the sale.111 If the 
claimed process could be patented, it would preempt “any application of 
the fundamental concept of hedging.”112 
Three judges responded with strong dissents specifically 
disagreeing with the adoption of the MOT test and the unwillingness of 
the court to follow prior precedent (State Street), or in the alternative 
overrule it. Judge Newman charged the majority with rewriting the term 
“process” in § 101 by limiting this category of patent claims to the 
MOT test in light of an ever-expanding technological climate.113 She 
 
902, 909 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
105 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962. 
106 Id.; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981) (involving a patent for a 
process of curing rubber).  
107 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962-63 (discussing the holding in Abele, involving the two-
dimensional depiction of X-ray data of bones, organs and other tissue).  
108 Id. at 963. 
109 Id. at 963-64. 
110 Id. at 964. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 965. 
113 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“This exclusion of process 
inventions is contrary to statute, contrary to precedent, and a negation of the constitutional 
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reasoned that “uncertainty is the enemy”114 when it comes to emerging 
fields of art, which in turn will disincentivize innovation.115 The court 
should have concerned itself with a forward-looking perspective as to 
the effects on innovation-based commerce.116 The test should remain as 
it is stated in the statute — requiring new and useful processes — and 
recognize as ineligible only “fundamental truths, laws of nature, and 
abstract ideas.”117 Bilski’s claim, in Judge Newman’s opinion, has yet to 
be evaluated for patentability.118 
Judge Mayer took a different approach, suggesting the majority 
had not gone far enough and called for State Street to be overruled, 
thereby excluding all business methods from patent protection.119 
Applying the “technological arts test,” Judge Mayer looked to the 
Constitution for Congress’ authority to protect the “useful arts,” a term 
we now interpret to mean technological innovations.120 Judge Mayer also 
engaged in an incentives-based analysis comparing business method 
patents like that at issue in Bilksi to pharmaceutical industry patents.121 
Whereas businesses have a built-in incentive to “stay ahead of [the] 
competition, and to make more profit,”122 the front-end costs and the 
high risks associated with the drug industry demand a reliance on strong 
patent protection.123 Because Bilski’s claim was based on business 
principles, it would not fall within patent eligible criteria.124 
Lastly, Judge Rader expressed in his dissent that this case could 
have been decided simply on the premise that Bilski attempted to claim 
an abstract idea.125 He believed that the majority relied on portions of 
previous Supreme Court opinions, taken out of context, to create a test 
that “ties our patent system to dicta from an industrial age decades 
 
mandate. Its impact on the future, as well as on the thousands of patents already granted, is 
unknown.”). 
114 Id. at 977. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 995. 
117 Id. at 997. 
118 Id.  
119 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 998 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
120 Id. at 1001 (citing Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en 
banc)).  
121 Id. at 1005-06. 
122 Id. at 1005.  
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 1010. 
125 Bilski, 545 F.3d. at 1011. 
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removed from the bleeding edge.”126 The approach taken by the majority 
does little to explain why the expansive language found in § 101 should 
suddenly be confined to the MOT test.127 In other words, “why should 
some categories of invention deserve no protection?”128 The Supreme 
Court has determined that the only limitations to the eligibility 
requirement in § 101 apply to natural laws, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas.129 These concepts encompass those things that cannot be 
invented at all.130 Finally, § 101 was purposefully written as a broad 
gatekeeper.131 This section still requires that the claim meet the other 
“conditions and requirements” of Title 35.132 
Toward the end of his dissent, Judge Rader dovetailed the § 101 
discussion in Bilski with Justice Breyer’s Labcorp dissent.133 He pointed 
to a clear distinction between the unpatentable relationship between 
homocysteine levels and low folate as opposed to the patentable method 
of detecting and treating said condition.134 As important as considering 
the language of the statute (which, in terms of § 101, Rader found the 
process in Labcorp patentable) is a reliance on the policy justifications 
derived from the Constitutional mandate — to utilize patents for the 
advancement of science and the useful arts.135 The MOT test leaves 
potential innovators unsure of the current law and understandably wary 
about investing large sums of money for potentially unpatentable 
processes.136 The far-reaching consequences of this decision risk 
“hobbling” advances and “may not incentivize, but [instead] complicate 
our search for the vast secrets of nature.”137 While the subject matter of 
 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 1012.  
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 1012-13 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)). 
130 Id. at 1013. 
131 Bilski,545 F.3d. at 1012. 
132 Id. at 1014. 
133 See infra Part III(A). 
134 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1014 (Rader, J., dissenting).  
135 Id.; see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 60 at 1581-82.   
136 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1014 (Rader, J., dissenting) (expressing his concern that research 
for conditions such as Lou Gerhrig’s disease or Parkinson’s will taper off due to such 
instability in the system); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2008) (the statutory safe harbor 
provision protecting those uses “reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information to the FDA”). But see Marcia Angell, The Truth about Drug Companies, 51 
N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 12, Jul. 15, 2004, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17244 
(discussing the billions of dollars earned by pharmaceuticals in the drug industry).  
137 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1015 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
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Bilski’s business method patent “is seemingly far removed from 
diagnostic claims,”138 the underlying determination of whether § 101 is 
met will have to conform to the same test regardless of whether the 
claims arise out of very different fields. 
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and more than 
seven months after hearing arguments for Bilski v. Kappos,139 the Court 
issued its opinion in June 2010 affirming the Federal Circuit’s finding 
that Bilski’s patent could not meet the § 101 standard.140 The Court, 
however rejected the notion that the MOT test could be the sole test for 
patent eligibility, providing little in the way of guiding precedent.141 
Specifically, the Court concluded that, “the machine-or-transformation 
test is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining 
whether some claimed inventions are processes under § 101.”142 
While all nine Justices agreed that the patent claim failed under § 
101, four Justices, in a concurrence written by Justice Stevens, 
expressed a strong sentiment that business methods should not be 
patent-eligible at all.143 The majority opinion, authored by Justice 
Kennedy, focused mostly on discrediting a narrow reading of patent 
eligibility by reference to prior case law and interpreting the statutory 
wording in its “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”144 
The Court, in refusing to define a test for patentability, succeeded 
only in endorsing the possibility that business methods could be patent 
eligible, while maintaining the current uncertainty regarding the 
patentability of diagnostic methods.145 This reasoning was subject to 
harsh criticism from Stevens in his concurrence. The majority’s reliance 
on prior patent case law coupled with its insistence on not limiting the 
doctrine beyond the literal word in the Patent Act, means that the 
“analysis (or lack thereof) may have led to the correct outcome in this 
case, but it also means that the Court’s musings on this issue stand for 
 
138 Kevin E. Noonan, Applying In re Bilski to Diagnostic Method Claims, PATENT DOCS 
(Feb, 5, 2009, 3:07 PM), http://www.patentdocs.org/2009/09/applying-in-re-bilski-to-
diagnostic-method-claims.html. 
139 Bilski v. Kappos (Bilski II), 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
140 Id. at 3231. 
141 Id.  
142 Id. at 3227. 
143 Id. at 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“More precisely, although a process is not 
patent-ineligible simply because it is useful for conducting business, a claim that merely 
describes a method of doing business does not qualify as a ‘process’ under § 101.”). 
144 Id. at 3226 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)).  
145 Bilski II, 130 S. Ct. at 3228.  
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very little.”146 What this opinion means for diagnostic tests would be the 
focus of the next two cases, Prometheus Laboratories v. Mayo 
Collaborative Services and Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen, 
each to be considered for a second time in the Federal Circuit upon the 
Supreme Court’s issuance of GVR Orders one day after deciding 
Bilski.147 
C. Prometheus Laboratories v. Mayo Collaborative Services148 
(Prometheus I and II) 
The first of these cases, Prometheus Laboratories v. Mayo 
Collaborative Services, involves a process for determining the correct 
dosage for thiopurine drugs used in the treatment of gastrointestinal and 
non-gastrointestinal autoimmune disorder.149 After the drug is 
administered to a patient, the body breaks it down into its metabolite 
components, specifically 6-MMP and 6-TG,150 commonly used for their 
immunosuppressive properties.151 Calibrating the correct dosage for use 
in patients suffering from Crohn’s Disease and inflammatory bowel 
diseases require a patient-specific analysis to “optimize therapeutic 
efficacy while minimizing toxic side effects.”152 As such, the process 
involves two steps: (1) administering the drug to the subject, and (2) 
determining the level of the drug’s metabolites and comparing those 
measurements to pre-determined levels in order to adjust the level 
 
146 Id. at 3236 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
147 Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Supreme Court’s Controversial GVR- And an 
Alternative, 107 MICH. L. REV. 711, 712 (2009) (“[T]he procedure for summarily granting 
certiorari, vacating the decision below without finding error, and remanding the case for 
further consideration by the lower court. The GVR is most commonly used when the ruling 
below might be affected by one of the Court’s recently rendered decisions, which was 
issued after the lower court ruled.”).  
148 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. (Prometheus II), 628 F.3d 1347 
(Fed. Cir. 2010); Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. (Prometheus I), 581 
F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
149 Prometheus I, 581 F.3d. at 1339. 
150 These stand for 6-mthyl-mercaptopurine and 6-thioguanine. Significant research 
regarding 6-TG has determined that it can very often lead to toxicity if not monitored with 
extreme care. Chris J.J. Mulder, et al., On Tolerability and Safety of a Maintenance 
Treatment with 6-Thioguanine in Azathioprine or 6-Mercaptopurine Intolerant IBD 
Patients, 11(35) WORLD J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 5540 (2005), available at 
http://www.wjgnet.com/1007-9327/11/5540.asp (suggesting the importance of providing for 
a specific system of administration and analysis).  
151 Prometheus I, 581 F.3d at 1339.  
152 Id. 
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accordingly.153 The Mayo Clinic had previously received a license to use 
Prometheus’ test, but in 2004 announced that it would begin utilizing its 
own test, which used different levels to determine toxicity.154 
On granting Mayo’s motion for summary judgment, the district 
court found significant bars to eligibility under § 101. The court began 
by characterizing the test as a combination of “‘administering’ and 
‘determining’ steps [that] are merely necessary data-gathering steps for 
any use of the correlations and that as construed, the final step — the 
‘warning’ step. . .is only a mental step.”155 According to the district 
court, this correlation represented an expression of a natural process, 
“and the inventors merely observed the relationship between these 
naturally produced metabolites and therapeutic efficacy and toxicity.”156 
Since the patent was drawn to the correlations specifically, it would 
wholly preempt a natural phenomenon and was thus ineligible under § 
101. 
1. Prometheus I 
Applying the Bilski machine or transformation test, the Federal 
Circuit disagreed, finding the claims patentable because they satisfied 
the transformation prong of the MOT test at two different junctures in 
the process.157 First, the court found that the administration of the drug 
into the body creates a transformation of the drug, and “various 
chemical and physical changes of the drug’s metabolites that enable 
their concentrations to be determined.”158 Where the court below framed 
the claim as one involving a process of correlations, Judge Lourie 
viewed the claims as “methods of treatment, which are always 
transformative when a defined group of drugs is administered to the 
body to ameliorate the effects of an undesired condition.”159 Innately this 
process should be characterized as a treatment, the goal of which is a 
 
153 Id.  
154 Id. at 1340. 
155 Id. at 1341 (quoting Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04cv1200, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25062, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008)).  
156 Id.  
157 Prometheus I, 581 F.3d at 1345-46. Prometheus also attempted to persuade the court 
that a third transformation occurred when the “metabolite levels are transformed into a 
warning for a doctor to alter the dosage,” but the court  affirmed the lower court’s 
determination that this represented merely a mental step. Id.  
158 Id. at 1346. 
159 Id.  
BEFELER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2011  7:38 PM 
2011 PATENT ELIGIBILITY FOR DIAGNOSTIC METHODS 505 
transformation in the body.160 In its argument on appeal, Prometheus 
distinguished the transformation that occurs as the result of the 
administration of the drug, rather than as a result of a natural process.161 
Agreeing with this assertion, the court relied on Bilski I for approval in 
that “it is virtually self-evident that a process for a chemical or physical 
transformation of physical objects or substances is patent-eligible 
subject matter.”162 
Second, the court found that the determining step is also 
transformative because it involves manipulation of the data in such a 
way that “at the end of the process, the human sample is no longer 
human blood; human tissue is no longer human tissue.”163 These 
measurements are an integral part of making the determination.164 The 
manipulation of both the chemical and physical properties of the 
physical samples is sufficient to meet the Bilski transformation prong.165 
The court also addressed the secondary limitation imposed by the 
MOT test: the process must not be “merely insignificant extra-solution 
activity.”166 As explained above, the court considered these 
transformations the primary objective of the process, without which 
there would be no claim. The court distinguished this type of diagnostic 
test from that claimed in In re Gram.167 In Gram, the applicant sought to 
patent a process involving (1) clinical testing, and (2) a determination of 
whether an abnormality existed based on the findings.168 Based on those 
facts the court found only a mathematical algorithm combined with a 
data-gathering step, rather than the series of transformative steps found 
in Prometheus’ process.169 Unlike the clinical test in Gram, 
 
160 Id. 
161 Id. Prometheus attempts to draw clear distinctions similar to those discussed in 
Judge Rader’s dissent in Bilski. Science in general involves the manipulation of natural 
principles arising out of physics, chemistry, and so on. Even when man-made inventions put 
these principles to use, it is the ultimate representation of progress — a deeper 
understanding of the world and its inner workings. Id.  
162 Id. at 1346-47 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).  
163 Prometheus I, 581 F.3d at 1347 (quoting the Declaration of Prometheus’ expert, Dr. 
Yves Théorêt). 
164 Id.  
165 Id. 
166 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 
(1978)).  
167 In re Gram, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
168 Prometheus I, 581 F.3d at 1348.  
169 Id. 
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“Prometheus’s claimed methods are not ‘merely’ data-gathering steps or 
‘insignificant extra-solution activity’; they are part of treatment regimes 
for various diseases using thiopurine drugs.”170 
As a final consideration, the court dismissed any notion that the 
inclusion of a mental step within the process could be dispositive stating 
that, “a subsequent mental step will not negate the transformative nature 
of prior steps.”171 The claim must be viewed as a whole.172 Specifically, 
the final step in the Prometheus test, the “warning” step, does not 
invalidate the transformative nature of the whole process.173 
2. Prometheus II 
The Supreme Court issued a GRV order summarily granting 
certiorari, vacating the court of appeals’ judgment, and remanding to the 
Federal Circuit based on the court’s holding in Bilski II.174 Because the 
Bilski II opinion made it clear that the MOT test could still provide 
useful guidance on the patentability issue, the Federal Circuit saw no 
need to reanalyze Prometheus under a different standard.175 While the 
court did apply the MOT test in Prometheus I in finding a 
transformation on two levels, it also determined that the claim was not 
drawn to a law of nature or natural phenomenon and therefore could not 
preempt all uses of the recited correlations.176 Revisiting this language in 
Prometheus II, the court, 
[D]id not think that either the Supreme Court’s GVR Order or the 
Court’s Bilski decision dictates a wholly different analysis or a 
different result on remandFalseThe Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bilski did not undermine our preemption analysis of Prometheus’s 
claims and it rejected the machine-or-transformation test only as a 
definitive test. The Court merely stated that “[t]he Court of Appeals 
incorrectly concluded that this Court has endorsed the machine-or-
 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 1348. 
172 Id. at 1349 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 958 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[E]ven though 
a fundamental principle itself is not patent-eligible, processes incorporating a fundamental 
principle may be patent-eligible. Thus, it is irrelevant that any individual step or limitation 
of such processes by itself would be unpatentable under section 101.”).  
173 Id. 
174 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010) 
(mem.).  
175 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. (Prometheus II), 628 F.3d 
1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
176 Id.  
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transformation test as the exclusive test.” 130 U.S. at 3226 (emphasis 
added). . . . Thus, the Court did not disavow the machine-or-
transformation test. And, as applied to the present claims, the “useful 
and important clue, an investigative tool,” leads to a clear and 
compelling conclusion, viz., that the present claims pass muster 
under § 101. They do not encompass laws of nature or preempt 
natural correlations.177 
The opinion leaves little doubt that the patent eligibility issue has 
yet to be resolved, despite the Federal Circuit’s willingness to 
seemingly broaden its view of diagnostic method patents under § 101. 
The court even referenced the multiple citations in Bilski II to Justice 
Breyer’s strong dissent in Labcorp, regarding the dangers of patenting 
biomedical correlations, as “fail[ing] to transform a dissent into 
controlling law.”178 Without limitations imposed from the outside, it is 
unlikely that the Federal Circuit will independently narrow its analysis 
of similar biotechnology process claims. 
D. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen179 
Currently on remand from the Supreme Court, Classen involves a 
series of patents held by Classen for a process of evaluating and 
improving the safety of immunization schedules.180 Classen claimed 
Biogen infringed these patents when Biogen examined the correlation 
between certain vaccination schedules and immune deficiencies and 
ultimately developed a vaccine using this data. The district court relied 
on the natural phenomenon exclusion discussed in Diamond v. Diehr in 
finding that the patent attempted to claim a natural phenomenon.181 The 
court stated that determining patentability requires looking at the patent 
as a whole, and while variation on a previous process may still qualify, 
“[i]nsignificant post-solution activity will not transform an unpatentable 
principle into a patentable process.”182 The court analyzed the limitations 
 
177 Id.  
178 Id. at 1356 n.2. 
179 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, 304 F. App’x 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(unpublished decision). 
180 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, Civ. No. WDQ-04-2607, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 98106, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 16, 2006). 
181 Id. at *11-14 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“Einstein could 
not patent his celebrated law that E = mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of 
gravity. Such discoveries are manifestations of nature free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none.”)). 
182 Id. at *12 (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188). 
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inherent in patenting both abstract ideas and natural phenomenon, and, 
declining to consider each theory separately, concluded that Classen’s 
patent involved merely “thinking about” the connection between 
vaccination schedules and immune deficiency — a correlation 
determined by biology, not human ingenuity.183 
The opinion is somewhat unclear as to why the court ultimately 
relied on the “natural phenomenon” principle. In a single-line, 
unpublished affirmation of the decision, the Federal Circuit cited its 
holding in Bilski as controlling.184 The court provided no further 
explanation as to why Dr. Classen’s patent failed to meet the 
transformation test. The Supreme Court also issued a GVR Order for 
Classen based on the Court’s holding in Bilski.185 As of the date of this 
Note, the Federal Circuit has yet to issue another opinion with regards 
to Classen. 
IV. FINDING A PROPER BALANCE TO THE COMPETING 
POLICY INTERESTS UNDERLYING THE DEBATE OVER 
ELIGIBILITY OF DIAGNOSTIC METHOD PATENTS UNDER § 
101 
The inability of other mechanisms to successfully incentivize 
spending for research and development in the biotechnology industry 
suggests that patent protection for diagnostic methods is the best means 
of encouraging the progress of the useful arts.186 Private rights afford 
exclusivity, which in turn provides the economic incentive to invest in 
burgeoning innovations. Without such security, the billions of dollars187 
invested in the industry would undoubtedly decrease. The tradeoff for 
exclusivity contemplated by Congress is the supposed benefit derived 
 
183 Id. at *15. The district court’s exact language uses a combination of terms in its 
decision, finding that “it would appear that the 139 and 739 patents are an indirect attempt 
to patent the idea that there is a relationship between vaccine schedules and chronic immune 
mediated disorders, the Court finds they are an attempt to patent an unpatentable natural 
phenomenon.” Id. (emphasis added). 
184 Classen Immunotherapies, 304 F. App’x at 867 (“In light of our decision in In re 
Bilski,, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment that these claims are 
invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Dr. Classen’s claims are neither ‘tied to a particular machine 
or apparatus’ nor do they ‘transform[] a particular article into a different state or thing.’ 
Therefore we affirm.” (citations omitted)). 
185 Id.  
186 See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT 41 (2009).  
187 See 2008 Investment in U.S. Health Research, supra note 61.  
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from new and useful inventions later bestowed upon society. Because of 
the diverse and unique nature of a patent system that applies to many 
different industries, amending the Patent Act to reflect varying 
eligibility requirements or adopting overly restrictive tests, such as the 
MOT test, would undermine the purposefully broad sweep of the Patent 
Act. 
Given the rationales for patent protection, coupled with the Federal 
Circuit’s application of the MOT test in Prometheus II, the future of 
patentability for diagnostic method patents looks promising. A claim 
will almost assuredly meet the § 101 standard where the process is 
similar to that in Prometheus, in which the court considered either the 
“administering” step or the “determining” step transformative. As the 
Federal Circuit stated in Prometheus, “methods of treatment . . . are 
always transformative when . . . drugs [are] administered to the body to 
ameliorate the effects of an undesired condition.”188 
The relevant policy concerns for the disallowance of patent 
protection for diagnostic methods focus on the fear that privatizing 
diagnostic methods will impede the practice of medicine and 
significantly increase costs for patients. In order to balance the 
competing rationales of incentivizing the industry and promoting the 
public welfare, this Note suggests that Congress consider an amendment 
to the Medical Practitioner Exception under 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), which 
would eliminate the availability of a remedy where a physician infringes 
a pure process patent or a biotechnology process patent.189 This would 
meet the competing demands halfway by still prohibiting the 
infringement of a valid patent and protecting the patentee from unlawful 
use of the patented process by research competitors or even third parties 
who facilitated infringement, but would now recognize the importance 
of allowing physicians to diagnose and treat patients by the most 
appropriate means available. 
 
188 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. May Collaborative Servs. (Prometheus I), 581 F.3d 1336, 
1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).  
189 Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Medical Process Patents — 
Monopolizing the Delivery of Health Care, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2036, 2039 (2006), 
available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/faculty/michellemello/files/Labcorp_published 
version.pdf. 
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A. The Medical Practitioner Exception to Patent Infringement 
Remedies 
Although the harmonizing of United States patent law with 
international law is a complex topic outside the scope of this Note, 
Congress’ addition of § 287(c) to the Patent Act, in light of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(hereinafter “TRIPS”),190 suggests an unwillingness to deny patents for 
diagnostic testing.191 Specifically, TRIPS Article 27.3 allows members to 
deny patentability for “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for 
the treatment of humans or animals.”192 Originally, Congress refused to 
adopt any portion of Article 27.3.193 However, public outrage over a 
surgical patent lawsuit sparked reform,194 resulting in the adoption of 
legislation designed specifically to protect physicians and other 
healthcare providers from patent infringement liability pertaining to the 
use of certain medical procedures.195 Even though Congress carved out 
this exception, it did so while preserving the prohibition against 
unlicensed use of a process patent. 196 Specifically, the rule defines 
exempted “medical activity” as, 
[T]he performance of a medical or surgical procedure on a body, but 
shall not include (i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter in violation of such patent, (ii) the practice of 
a patented use of a composition of matter in violation of such patent, 
or (iii) the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology 
 
190 See generally Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
art. 27.3(a), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter “TRIPS”]; WTO and the TRIPS 
Agreement, WORLD HEALTH ORG. http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy 
/wto_trips/en/index.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2011).  
191 John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 685, 722-23 (2002).  
192 TRIPS, supra note 190.  
193 Duffy, supra note 191, at 722. 
194 Id. at 722 n.121 (“Method of Making Self-Sealing Episcleral Incision,” U.S. Pat. No. 
5,080,111 (issued Jan.14, 1992)). 
195 35 U.S.C. § 287 (1999). The statute states, in relevant part: 
With respect to a medical practitioner’s performance of a medical activity that 
constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or (b) of this title, the 
provisions of sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 of this title shall not apply against 
the medical practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to 
such medical activity. 
196 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A)(iii).  
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patent.197 
The Medical Practitioner Exception represents a Congressional 
understanding that while some medical procedures are viable candidates 
for patentability, patent enforcement against physicians can represent an 
unfair burden on the medical profession.198 Furthermore, where a patient 
requires surgical treatment, such necessity reaffirms the principle that 
the “embarrassment of a patent” must yield in certain circumstances.199 
As currently written, however, § 287(c) narrowly covers only medical 
or surgical procedures, while excluding the practice of patented 
biotechnology processes — an often necessary component to medical 
diagnosis and treatment. In order to better reflect the policy rationales 
underlying the medical practitioner carve-out, a legislative solution is 
necessary. 
B. The Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002 
Recent reform measures have attempted to incorporate this concept 
by amending the infringement liability section of the Patent Act to limit 
the impact of gene patenting on the medical community. While such 
measures have yet to garner significant support, one in particular can 
provide a germane perspective on how the Medical Practitioner 
Exception to patent infringement could be amended so as to exempt 
physicians from liability for the use of certain biomedical process 
patents. Specifically, in an initial attempt to amend § 287, 
Representative Lynn Rivers (Democrat-MI) introduced The Genomic 
Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002 (hereinafter 
“GRDAA”),200 aimed at establishing “limited exemptions from liability 
for certain uses of patented genetic sequences and genetic sequence 
 
197 Id. (emphasis added). 
198 Emtel, Inc. v. LipidLabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811, 822 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (citing 
statements of Senator Frist:”My legislation would prevent the enforcement of so-called pure 
medical procedure patents against health professionals . . . [T]his narrowly tailored 
legislation would in no way discourage the important research being done in these areas of 
medicine. . . . My legislation is very narrow in scope. It would simply prevent the 
enforcement of patents against health professional or their affiliated facilities for pure 
procedure patents . . . .”). 
199 Id.; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), available at 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html (“Considering the 
exclusive right to invention as given not of natural right, but for the benefit of society, I 
know well the difficulty of drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public 
the embarrassment of an exclusive patent.”). 
200 GRDAA, supra note 7. 
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information in the context of basic research and genetic diagnostic 
testing.”201 In relevant part, the GRDAA proposed an exemption from 
“infringement remedies” for the performance by a medical practitioner 
of any “genetic diagnostic, prognostic, or predictive test or a medical or 
surgical procedure.”202 
As the first among many attempts to regulate gene patenting and 
associated process patents, the GRDAA focuses solely on genetic 
correlations, but excludes “pure process patents”203 such as the vitamin 
deficiency correlations in Labcorp or the treatment method comprising 
measurement of metabolites and dosage regulation in Prometheus. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of this provision is rendered moot where 
the patentee also owns a patent for the underlying product or drug. For 
example, in a case currently on appeal to the Federal Circuit, Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
Myriad’s patent claims both isolated DNA for the BRCA gene and a 
corresponding method for comparing DNA.204 Liability would still 
attach for a physician in these scenarios because testing involves using 
both the gene and the process.205 
As compared to later, more aggressive legislation aimed at 
completely barring gene-related patents,206 GRDAA focuses narrowly on 
addressing the concerns of gene patent critics especially in relation to 
the impact on the medical community. The exception for infringement 
liability would only apply to physicians, while third parties performing 
the test (for example, test kit suppliers) would still face liability under 
 
201 Christopher M. Holman, Recent Legislative Proposals Aimed at the Perceived 
Problem of Gene Patenting, 2008 A.B.A. SEC. OF SCI. & TECH. L. 2, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/scitech/biotech/pdfs/recent_legislati
ve_chris_holman.authcheckdam.pdf. 
202 GRDAA, supra note 7.  
203 Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 189, at 2039. 
204 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent & Trademark Office et al., 
No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418, at *149 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2010). As of the 
date of this Note’s publication, the Federal Circuit is currently considering the issue of the 
subject matter eligibility for DNA as a composition of matter as well as the patentability of 
the corresponding method claim. See Federal Circuit Hears Myriad Gene Patent Case, 
PATENTLY-O (Apr. 4, 2011, 6:45 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/04/federal-
circuit-hears-myriad-gene-patent-case.html. 
205 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2010) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever 
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention. . . any patented 
invention. . . infringes the patent.”) (emphasis added). 
206 See generally Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong. 
(2007). 
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direct or indirect infringement.207 Despite the GRDAA’s modest focus, 
Congress did not amend the Medical Practitioner Exception. 
C. Proposals for Amending § 287(c) 
In a 2006 New England Journal of Medicine article, written in 
response to Labcorp, Aaron Kesselheim and Michelle Mello discuss the 
impact of process patents from a clinician’s perspective.208 The article 
identified three categories of process patents encountered by physicians: 
pure process patents, processes related to patented drugs or products, 
and techniques used to isolate compounds or build devices.209 With 
regards to the first type, pure process patents, the patent is only drawn to 
the process and not to an underlying patented product. The problem 
associated with such patents illuminates the same issues targeted by 
Justice Breyer in his Labcorp dissent. While ordering the test would 
constitute infringement, “‘it would be malpractice’ for a doctor to 
receive an assay result showing elevated total homocysteine levels and 
not consider cobalamin or folate deficiency as a cause.”210 
In order to eliminate this exposure to risk, the article targets the 
first two categories of processes utilized by physicians and suggests that 
appropriate action must be taken either by the courts or Congress. First, 
the Patent Office and the courts should apply a “more critical eye” to 
such process claims and invalidate patents where the process involves 
only a procedural step instead of an actual transformation. As the case 
law has demonstrated, this result is unlikely. In the alternative, the 
article offers a legislative solution whereby § 287(c) would be amended 
to expand the definition of “medical activity” to include pure process 
patents and those patents involving use of a patented product or drug.211 
This amendment reflects a more comprehensive protection for 
physicians than that offered by the GRDAA by extending the exception 
to all processes instead of only gene-related processes. In truth, the 
authors consider abolition of patent protection for most medical process 
patents the most appealing alternative, but they recognize that a “sea 
 
207 Holman, supra note 201, at 3. 
208 Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 189, at 2039.  
209 Id. at 2039-40. The third type of process, “techniques used to isolate compounds or 
build devices,” is an important research tool and can contribute to innovations in the 
development of diagnostic test, but does not directly impact patient care. Id.  
210 Id. at 2039 (quoting Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 
1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).  
211 Id. at 2040.  
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change” in the law is unlikely and probably too severe a measure 
considering the harmful impact on business arrangements and existing 
patents.212 
It is the middle ground that affords the best opportunity to meet the 
goals of patent law while safeguarding physicians from unethical 
intrusions into the practice of medicine. Exempting pure process patents 
and biotechnology process patents from infringement liability for 
physicians would cover correlations and diagnostic and treatment 
methods that form the basis for personalized medical care, an integral 
component to better and more effective patient care. A narrowly tailored 
exemption, one that would not cover processes related to patented drugs 
and devices specifically, resembles many of the same concerns inherent 
in § 287(c): allowing the unhindered practice of medicine while not 
declaring such patents invalid.213 
V. CONCLUSION 
The progression of process patent case law over the past few years 
lends credence to the theory that subject matter eligibility will once 
again fade into the background of patent litigation. The anticipation 
leading up to the Supreme Court’s hearing of Bilski only resulted in 
reestablishing the § 101 doctrine as it existed previously, while 
endowing the Federal Circuit with the ability to apply the MOT test but 
refrain from labeling it the exclusive test for determining patentability. 
When all was said and done, both Bilksi and Prometheus achieved the 
same result. With these cases laid to rest, it appears that diagnostic 
method patents, as a category, may be safe from § 101 invalidity so long 
as the claim is found not to preempt a fundamental principle. 
Once patentability is established, it is the duty of Congress to 
weigh the competing policy rationales underlying the protection of this 
viable form of patents, while preventing their misuse against physicians 
practicing within the parameters of proper patient care. A physician who 
is prevented from making certain determinations based on a failure to 
obtain a license to use the patented process, retarding the care of a 
patient as a consequence, faces an unfair restraint and makes all the 
more clear that infringement liability should not be the measure of 
healthcare. Amending § 287(c) to include the practice of pure process 
 
212 Id.  
213 Leisa Talbert Peschel, Revisiting the Compromise of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), 16 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L. J. 299, 300 (2008). 
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patents and biotechnology process patents under the definition of 
exempted medical activities meets the needs of all involved by seeking 
an ethical solution while not compromising the stature of diagnostic 
methods as patentable processes. The ever-evolving nature of scientific 
advances and biotechnology inventions demands that Congress should 
take care in reforming patent law. With that in mind, “limited changes 
aimed at making the . . . litigation of biotechnology patents . . . more 




214 CLAUDE BARFIELD & JOHN E. CALFEE, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE PATENT SYSTEM: 
BALANCING INNOVATION AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 91 (2007).  
